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Ladies  and Gentlemen, 
I  very much  appreciate the opportunity to participate in 
today's conference.  Trade in dairy products has  grown, 
together with u.s.  dairy surpluses,to an  important agenda 
item in US/EC  discussions. 
The  European  Economic  Community, in short EC has  since 
1981  10 Member  States and  about 270  million people. 
Measured  on the basis of deliveries to dairies or dealers, 
the  Community  is the world's first milk producer with about 
100 milli.on tons of milk per year,  followed  in the West 
by the United States with about  60  million tons. 
Unfortunately,  we  share still other records which are those 
of surpluses.  At  the end of 1982  both our countries held 
together about  80%  of the uncommitted world stocks,each 
in butter and non-fat dry milk  (NFDM).  In butter the EC 
held  306,000  tons against 175,000 tons in the u.s.  In 
NFDM  we  were closer together -with 574.000  tons in the EC 
.and  555.000  tons in the u.s.  In cheese finally the u.s. 
are first with  351.000  tons  in stock, while the EC  has 
nearly none,  due  to the fact that cheese is no  regular 
intervention product in the Community,  although the  EC  is 
also the worlds  first cheese exporter. 
Were  these surpluses only temporary ones,  we  could be re-
laxed.  It seems,  however,  that international demand  for 
dairy products does  not keep  up  in the foreseeable  future 
with increasing supplies.  The  gap between supply and 
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demand is such,  that even traditional exporters like the 
EC  and  New  Zealand find no  longer the  same  export oppor-
tunities as in recent years.  The  world trade in NFDM  declined 
since 1979  and world butter trade since 1981,  while trade in 
cheese and condensed milk  shows  only modest expansion. 
Domestically,  the situation in major developed countries 
is rather similar. 
u.s.  surplus stocks are in such  a  situation,therefore 
an additional burden not only to the u.s., but - by their 
simple existence,  also for international trade in which the 
u.s.  had only little part in the past. 
A closer look  shows  that the world surplus situation is 
even worse  than regularly publicized stock figures  suggest. 
In order to maintain,  in cooperation with New  Zealand in parti-
cular, world prices of butter and nonfat dry milk at 
reasonable levels,  the Community  uses nearly any suitable 
avenue either to prevent production or to dispose of major 
surplus quantities domestically. 
Preventive  measures,  apart  from price  policy measures to 
which  I  will come  later,  include the payment of premiums 
for the cessation of farming,  for the conversion of herds 
from milk to meat  production, for the non-marketing of milk, 
for  the slaughtering of  cCJN.s,  etc.  Furthermore,  ·.dairy 
facilities are excluded  from  investment support programs. 
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In recent years,  the Community  had  spent on  such preventive 
programs  about half a  billion dollars. 
In the area of domestic disposal,  most noteworthy are 
the sales of butter and  NFDl-1  at reduced prices.  Regarding hltter such 
measures  include 
general butter price subsidies which apply in the 
United Kingdom,  Ireland,  Luxumbourg  and  Denmark,  and 
are open  for other Member  States if they choose to apply it 
so-called Christmas butter sales at reduced prices 
- subsidized sales to special social groups  such as 
welfare receivers 
sales to armed  forces  and non-profit organizations 
sales for the production of butter concentrate and 
finally 
sales to the  food  industry such as bakeries and the 
icecream manufacturers. 
In 1982  about  200.000  tons were  sold by  the last four  measures 
and nearly 1_00. 000  tons were in addition available for 
Christmas butter sales.  How  much  was  sold by general 
consumer  subsidies in the  4  mentioned Member  States  I  don't 
know,  but it is  clear, that there are financial and prac-
tical limits to direct consumption subsidies.  Experience 
shows  that butter consumption does not increase propor-
tionally to price reductions.  If a  massive  increase in 
consumption  should be achieved,  price reduction would  have - 4  -
to be  such,  that it becomes  unbearable for  any budget. 
'  The  same is true regarding price subsidies for butter used 
in the food  industry where butter prices have  to be brought 
close to prices for vegetable oils and  fats.  Nevertheless, 
at least one half  of overall EC  domestic  consumption of 
butter was  subsidized in 1982. 
In NFDM  the domestic disposal programs were  even more 
fascinating.  In 1982 only about one sixth or 250,000  tons 
of NFDM  were  sold domestically at full market price.  1. 34 
million tons were  subsidized into animal  feed  - in parti-
cular for calves  feeding  and in smaller quantities for pigs 
and poultry. 
These various domestic efforts,  undertaken in order to 
stabilise domestic prices,  to keep  stocks at reasonable 
levels and  to protect world market prices,  cost the 
Community  in 1982  about 1.4 billion dollars.  To  this 
amount  has to be added  350  million dollars storage costs, 
ending up in total costs of about 1.750 billion dollars 
for domestic intervention programs which do not include 
export refunds  and  food aid expenditure. 
Export refunds  for dairy.products  amounted  1982  to about 
2.3 billion dollars,  which brings our total 1982  dairy 
to 
budget/somewhat more  than  4  billion dollars. 
When  comparing these figures with expenditures in the u.s., 
we  should keep  in mind,  that our expenditures,  because of 
different bookkeeping methods,  are definitive expenditures - 5 
while u.s.  outlays represent to a  large extent the costs 
of purchase of surplus products,  which  when  sold back in 
one  form or another,  should still generate  some  revenues. 
Dairy expenditures of more  than 4  billion dollars accounted 
in 1982  for about one third of the EC  agricultural budget. 
All these indications no  doubt  show  you  the importance 
which  we  attach to the dairy sector and at the  same  time 
to the preservation and development of our markets  for dairy 
products.  Your  Federal Department of Agriculture is aware 
of this,  as  recent statements clearly indicate.  I  don•t 
wish to discuss  indepth the wisdom of such  statements,  but 
let me  briefly say  the  following:  Any  unilateral u.s. 
measures to capture part of the world dairy market by 
dumping u.s.  surpluses,  and  I  have not invented this ex-
pression,  would  force  the Community  to take protective 
measures  which would certainly not be in the interest of the 
u.s.  Speaking at this point absolutely personally,  some 
of those measures  could be 
Complaj,nts  under  prov~s~ons of GATT  against the 
New  Zealand 
United States;; and others might  join  the EC  in 
such procedures. 
Increase in export refunds  in order to maintain 
our markets  and  a  close look at the  few  small 
markets  the u.s.  had  so far for  some  of its dairy 
surpluses. 
~  Once  export refunds  become  too expensive,  the EC 
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may  increase'domestic disposal programs which naturally 
would displace,  among  others,  soybeans  from the United 
States. 
Finally, if worse comes  to worst,  we  might even  be 
obliged to resort to direct import restrictions. 
Looking at these  prospects,nobody·~ and certainly not the 
United States - can wish to see it happen.  Any  confron-
tation  ... over dairy would spill over into other trade areas 
and finally affect our overall bilateral relationship. 
For other countries a  U.S./EC dairy war would mean major 
losses,  and  for  New  Zealand it would result in near banc-
ruptcy.  The  only country sure to gain from it, would  be the 
Soviet Union. 
Probably not so many  in the_ u.s.  public or even  in the industry 
know  how  small and fragile the free part of the international 
dairy market really is.  In order to illustrate to you this 
point,  please let me  quote  some  parts of a  statement on 
behalf of the New  Zealand Dairy Board before the Senate 
Committee  on Agriculture on February 25,  1983: 
"  About  5  percent of total milk production is sold outside 
the country in which it is produced.  Thus,  about  95  % is 
consumed domestically,  with the largest dairy markets in 
the world being those of the European  Community,  the Soviet 
Union,  and the·u.s.  Between  them they produce  and  consume 
more  than half of the world's milk. 
0-f  the  5  % of  "world"  markets  that are "international", 
about half are governed by access restrictions in the  form - 7  -
of quotas  and other Government trade barriers;  so that 
the international markets which are open to commercial  compe-
tition amount to only about  2  % - 3  % of total world dairy 
consumption. 
For example,  in 1980 world butter production was  6,550,000 
tons  a  year.  Of  .this,  5,930,000  tons were  consumed within 
the producing countries,  with an additional  418,000  tons 
imported under quotas or other Government restrictions. 
~ 
Only  202,000  tons of business was  in the  form of exports 
to markets which are not subject to official restrictions. 
CCC  support stocks earlier this week  were  427  million pounds, 
that is approximately 195,000  tons,  or nearly one year's 
total "non-quota"  international trade. 
Likewise,  cheese production worldwide was  11,600,000 tons 
in 1980,  of which  10,900,000 tons were  consumed ·in the pro-
ducing countries along with 230,000  tons  imported  under re-
strictive quotas  such as  those in the  US  and  EEC.  Cheese 
·.exports  to relatively "open"  markets were  just about  470,000 
tons  a  year,  but this comprised soft cheese,  processed cheese, 
semi-hard cheese and hard cheese other than cheddar,  as well 
as  cheddar.  The  residual market for cheddar cheese  was  about 
55,000  tons,  most of which was  supplied by  New  Zealand and 
Australia.  Current u.s.  Government stocks of cheddar are 
746  million pounds,  that is approximately  340,000  tons or 
enough  in theory to displace all other cheddar exporting 
countries  for over six years. - 8  -
Non-fat dry milk  (NFDl-i)  is the other major product of 
significance.  World  production ran at about  4,340,000  tons 
in 1980,  with domestic consumption of about  3,130,000  tons, 
plus  30,000 tons of restricted imports,  for  a  total of close 
to 3,160,000 tons.  In addition about  200,000  tons went  for 
food  aid after the normal  inter-Governmental consultations 
to ensure that the donations posed no threat to commercial 
markets.  About  110,000 tons were sold in 1980  for animal 
feed  purposes at especially low  prices~  and  730,000 tons went 
for  use in milk recombining industries.  In the recombining 
trade the plants  (mostly in developing countries)  must be 
assured of continuity of supply and the continuing techno-
logical back-up  from specialists in the field.  This  then 
is a  specialized area of trade that could not be adequately 
supplied by the disposal of surplus product.  The  remaining 
commercial  exports of approximately 140,000 tons compare with 
current CCC  stocks of 1.3 billion pounds or nearly 600,000 
tons.  \ 
It seems  patently clear that there is simply not the market 
internationally to even  come  close to absorbing US  surpluses 
for years to come.  New  Zealand has neither alternative markets, 
nor the resources to hold more  than normal  commercial  stocks. 
It cannot therefore yield trade,  even under the pressure of 
competing subsidization by  Governments  abroad.  Under  such 
conditions prices would rapidly fall to the  GATT  minima,  and 
even  these could come  under pressure.  To  trade at these prices, - 9  -
if it were possible,  would cost the US  Government the 
difference between the support prices and the  GATT  minima, 
or about  $1.00 per pound for butter and cheese and  $0.70 
for  NFDM. 
For  New  Zealand,  such an outcome would be a  disaster." 
It follows  from what precedes,  that the United States 
should not set their hopes  on international markets.  In 
the commercial area only the Soviet Union was  in the recent 
past a  major factor.,  but in the last  few~ months  doubt  grew, 
whether or not the Soviets will purchase again volumes  as 
large as  in the past.  If New  Zealand,  the Community  and 
the u.s. wish to avoid for the remainder  this to be played 
out one  against the other,  we  have  to develop  a  trilateral 
approach characterized by  pragmatism.  Other potential 
commerical markets  lay in the developing countries,  but 
these markets  grow  too  slowly in order to absorb major 
additional volume.within the very near future. 
In the area of food aid,outlets are equally limited.  Dafry 
products are highly perishable as you  know  and major  investments 
not only in equipment  bu~ also in  ~ualified·persons are 
necessary  to bring the products to the people in need  and 
to help  them rather than doing harm.  Traditional dairy 
food  aid donors  including the u.s.  have probably filled already 
in the past any apparent need which can practically be served. - 10  -
Additional dairy donations  from  the  US  if not accompanied 
by major  investments  into infrastructure could only replace· 
food aid or commercial sales  from.other countries,  end up 
as waste or, worst of all, be  fed  under conditions which 
endanger rather than increase the health of the recipients. 
The  only short term remedy  in the present situation for  the 
us,  seems  to me  therefore,  to give even more  emphasis  to 
domestic disposal programs  as  shown  by the  EC. 
If we  can serve as  an  example in this respect,  unfortunately 
reasonable 
we  cannot with regard to the onl}1long  term solution which is 
at least a  freeze if not a  significant reduction in pro-
duction.  Let me  come  to this point a  little bit later, after 
summarizing the EC's  policy with regard to exports. 
In the area of food  aid,  the Community  continues to cooperate 
with recipient and donor countries alike in order to give 
recipients as  much  help as possible without interfering with 
commercial  trade.  New  approaches in food aid policy such 
as multiannual planning and cooperation in regional develop-
ment  plans may  help the  EC  to develop additional  demand 
and distribution facilities for dairy food  aid deliveries. 
In the commercial area,  the EC  intends to maintain atleast  itspre~t 
share in international dairy trade.  In butter and  NFDM  our 
share came  recently under pressure,  while we  did better in 
cheese exports,  where  the international market was  still .. -
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on the increase.  The  EC,  mainly via its Member  States' 
promotion offices,  participates also in market research 
and export promotion in order to increase worldwide  demand. 
Of  our  foremost  concern is,  however,  the protection of 
world market prices.  As  in the domestic market,  you don't 
sell that much  more  internationally when  prices are lower, 
and  lower  prices would mean  higher export costs or smaller 
revenues  for all countries participating in dairy exports. 
World market prices,  because of common  price discipline, 
nearly doubled in recent years.  The  GATT  dairy agreement, 
concluded at the end of the  Tokyo  Round,provides  a  useful 
framework  for international cooperation in this area. 
Of particular interest in our dairy exports are our ship-
ments  to the Unites States.  The  GATT  agreement  allows 
the  EC  to ship annually  43,554  tons of so-called quota 
cheese to the u.s.  The  United States have  been paid for 
this concession by  EC  concessions in other areas.  We  are 
therefore confident,  that no difficulties will be raised 
to such imports  •  More  as  a  footnote  I  should mention,  that 
the quotas  are  anyhow only legal because of a  GATTcwaiver 
granted many  years-ago.  It may  however  console you that 
we  have  not yet filled  all our quotas.  Non  quota cheeses 
reach the US-without export refunds  and  should therefore 
not create any  problem either. 
. -·~·· ·--: 
Sometimes  I  hear that such  imports replace domestic market production 
which is building up  in  form of stocks.  This is true to a  certain extent although not everybody in the u.s.  who  eats Roquefort would eat 
American  Blue or Cheddar if Roquefort were  not available.  But apart 
from the  GATT  aspect you could also get a  positive kick out of the 
situation.  It is a  fact that only cheese and  some  other products  such 
as yoghurt can still contribute to a  significant increase in con-
sumption.  Imports of such products play therefore an  important role 
in educating the consumer  and creating the demand  which  in the long run 
will also increasingly benefit the u.s.  producers  and  farmers. I  have 
already seen and  tasted very encouraging steps in this direction. 
Finally, let us  have  a  word  about imports of casein which is probably 
the only dairy product not yet under import quota.  By  trying to 
force it under quota as well,  the u.s.  risk only increased opposition 
against its so-called Section 22  import quotas  in general  and possibly 
retaliation.  In addition,  a  number of  ITC  investigations have  shown 
that casein imports  do not interfere with the domestic  support program. 
The  Comunity accounted in the recent past for about  25%  of u.s.  casein 
imports,  and  such trade is of particular importance to Ireland.  It 
would not mean  any change  to the u.s., would  the E.C.  be  denied access 
because of our casein production premiums.  Other countries  such as 
Australia and  New  Zealandwould easily take  up the share held by the E.C. 
However,  such u.s.  action against the E.C.  would be  a  violation of u.s. 
GATT  obligations. 
Regarding  imports  I  should briefly mention that the E.C.  is the second 
largest cheese importer after the United States and also the second 
largest butter importer after the Soviet Union. 
Let me  return to the domestic  front: 
With production and  consumption levels drifting more  and more  apart, 
it is  un~voidable that the Commununity  continues •  - 13 
and  even extends domestic disposal measures.  The  newest 
Commission proposal in this area suggests full Community 
financing of school milk programs which until now  are co-
financed by the  EC  and the Member  States budgets. 
Additional proposals certainly will follow.  But none of 
these measures  can bring a  final solution. 
Everybody  knows  that what  under market aspects would  be 
needed,  is a  freeze if not a  cut in production.  But every-
body  also knows  that this is - at ·least not yet  - politi-
cally  .:acceptable.  We  had during a  number of years support 
price freezes,  but even during  such times milk production 
increased.  we  tried to influence farmers'production decisions 
by  a  so-called co-responsibility levy which probably was 
never high enough to have  a  real impact except with regard 
to budget outlays were  the levy receipts finance at present 
about  10  % of surplus disposal costs.  We  kept support price 
increases  low at times of strongly increasing production 
costs and helped the smallest farmers  in defavored regions 
with deficiency payments  instead of adjusting support prices 
according to their needs.  We  try this year to limit~ price 
support increases for milkproducts to 2.5  %while proposing 
for the agricultural sector in general an increase of 5.5  %. 
But this measure  such as all others mentioned before will 
at best reduce the rate of production increase but not 
bring us much  closer to the solution of the real problem 
which  remains  mainly  a  structural one  and can only be over-
come  in the very long term. -14-
While u.s.  farmers  reduced their 
number  of dairy cows  from  25 million in 1944  to 11 millioncows 
today, the  EC  cow  number  has stabilized over the last 20 
years at around  25  million.  During the same  period production 
per dairy cow  increased from  6,600  pound  annually to slightly 
more  than 8,800 pounds.  Such  increase of productivity, 
although still well below the US,reflects  a  major change in 
our dairy  farm structure.  In the last lO  years the number 
of  farms  producing milk decreased by 2s·  % to about 1.  8 
million holdings.  This trend which was  accompanied by an 
increase in herdsize and the quality and health of the 
breeding stock, will continue although at a  lower  speed than 
in the past due  to adverse general  economic  conditions. 
} D  ue  to an  increase in the 
delivery rate of production to dairies which is today 
around  92  % and  further yield gains due to intensive feeding 
and continued breed selection,  we  will reach sooner or later 
average performance levels of 14,000  pounds  per cow  as 
today already observed in a  number  of states in the US. 
While  such evolution suggests  further restrictions in price 
support parallel to productivity gains,  the problem remains 
that productivity gains are distributed very unevenly  among 
farmers.  80  % of our dairy farms  carry fewer  than  20  dairy 
cows  each.  The  Community  average is only 15  cows  per  farm 
with 6.5  for  Italy on the one hand,  and  53  for  United King-
dom  on  the other. .... , 
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Many  of those smaller farms  have to make  a  living from 
their milk sales as they have not too many  alternatives. 
In addition,  they help to  pursue  \bY keeping their cows 
grazing,important ecological and other goals of the 
Community  including the very important aim to maintain."-···, 
a  sufficient infrastructure in rural areas.  And  in the end, 
the major increase in production does not come  from the 
small  farmers,  but from  the most productive ones who  invest 
heavily and use mainly purchased  feed stuff, much  of which 
comes  from the u.s.  There  are however  few  means  to 
avoid  such evolution.  The  Community  has  for legal and 
philosophical reasons never applied production quotas 
and until now  the Member  States are not yet ready to 
limit dairy support clearly to  --:  a  predetermined volume 
per  farm or used grassland acreage.  I  personally believe 
we  will not have much  choice but come  to some  sort of a 
system where  support levels are differentiated according 
to productivity.  Some  very  small steps are already taken 
in this direction,  but now  we  need in my  view a 
big  jump.  It may  not  stabilize~tely production but 
it will at least take  away  part of the financial  burden. 
A complete deficiency payment  system cannot be the answer 
as outlays would reach politically unacceptable levels. 
But introduced last year on  a  small scale for the most 
disad·vantaged producers it might in my  view become a  permanent 
part of a  more  complex  system. • 
-16-
To  conclude my  remarks,  let me  thank you for your attention 
and express the hope that a  US/EC  trade dispute over man's 
first soft drink can be  avoided  and  that we  will reach as 
brothers the Promised Land,  where milk  and  honey  flow in 
just the right amount. 